Websites have evolved from static document repositories into complex application platforms that process persistent user data, authentication credentials, transactions, customer information, and business-critical content. This evolution has consequently transformed web applications into attractive targets for attackers. The uploaded reference text, Web Application Security, 2nd Edition, emphasizes this historical transition and the increasing importance of protecting applications, users, data, and application interfaces.

This paper develops a security-oriented recovery methodology for compromised PHP-based content-management systems (CMS) and eCommerce platforms. The primary case study is the recovery of a Joomla 5.4.8 website affected by SEO spam, malicious injections, unauthorized accounts, or other forms of compromise, followed by migration to Joomla 6. WordPress and Magento/Adobe Commerce are introduced as comparative examples demonstrating the applicability of the methodology across different application architectures.

The proposed methodology combines incident response, threat modeling, secure application configuration, database security, authentication security, clean software reconstruction, extension validation, server hardening, and search-engine recovery. Rather than attempting to establish trust in an infected filesystem, the proposed approach establishes a new trust boundary by rebuilding application software from known-good sources and selectively recovering validated business data.

The paper incorporates security concepts from the reference book, including attack-vector identification, risk prioritization, SQL-injection awareness, XSS defense, CSRF protection, secure cookies, Content Security Policy (CSP), CORS, and threat modeling. The resulting framework is applicable to Joomla, WordPress, Magento/Adobe Commerce, and similar web application environments.

 

Recovery, Security Rebuild, and Upgrade of Compromised Joomla, WordPress, and Magento Websites-A Threat-Model-Driven Methodology for Malware Removal, Data Preservation, Platform Migration, Hardening, and SEO Recovery

Academic-Style Technical Research Paper

Abstract

Websites have evolved from static document repositories into complex application platforms that process persistent user data, authentication credentials, transactions, customer information, and business-critical content. This evolution has consequently transformed web applications into attractive targets for attackers. The uploaded reference text, Web Application Security, 2nd Edition, emphasizes this historical transition and the increasing importance of protecting applications, users, data, and application interfaces.

This paper develops a security-oriented recovery methodology for compromised PHP-based content-management systems (CMS) and eCommerce platforms. The primary case study is the recovery of a Joomla 5.4.8 website affected by SEO spam, malicious injections, unauthorized accounts, or other forms of compromise, followed by migration to Joomla 6. WordPress and Magento/Adobe Commerce are introduced as comparative examples demonstrating the applicability of the methodology across different application architectures.

The proposed methodology combines incident response, threat modeling, secure application configuration, database security, authentication security, clean software reconstruction, extension validation, server hardening, and search-engine recovery. Rather than attempting to establish trust in an infected filesystem, the proposed approach establishes a new trust boundary by rebuilding application software from known-good sources and selectively recovering validated business data.

The paper incorporates security concepts from the reference book, including attack-vector identification, risk prioritization, SQL-injection awareness, XSS defense, CSRF protection, secure cookies, Content Security Policy (CSP), CORS, and threat modeling. The resulting framework is applicable to Joomla, WordPress, Magento/Adobe Commerce, and similar web application environments.

Keywords: Joomla 5.4.8, Joomla 6, WordPress, Magento, Adobe Commerce, web application security, CMS security, eCommerce security, malware recovery, SEO spam, threat modeling, attack vectors, SQL injection, XSS, CSRF, CSP, database security, website hardening, incident response.

1. Introduction

The architecture of the World Wide Web has changed fundamentally.

Early websites primarily distributed documents. Modern web applications support:

• User accounts
• Authentication
• Persistent databases
• File uploads
• Online transactions
• APIs
• Social interaction
• eCommerce
• Cloud services
• Third-party integrations

The reference book describes this transition from document sharing toward application distribution and highlights how this transformation created new opportunities for attackers.

Modern CMS and eCommerce platforms therefore represent application ecosystems rather than simple websites.

A Joomla, WordPress, or Magento deployment may contain:

CMS Core + Plugins / Extensions / Modules + Themes / Templates + Database + Media + Users + APIs + Web Server + Operating System

A compromise of one component may affect the security assumptions of the entire system.

2. Research Problem

The conventional response to a compromised website is frequently:

1. Find malicious files.
2. Delete them.
3. Update the CMS.
4. Change the administrator password.
5. Return the website to production.

This approach can be inadequate.

An attacker may have established persistence through:

• Modified application files
• Database records
• Administrator accounts
• Scheduled tasks
• Plugins
• Extensions
• Themes
• Templates
• Uploaded files
• API credentials
• Server configuration

Consequently, the administrator may not know which components remain trustworthy.

The security problem can therefore be expressed as:

How can legitimate business data be recovered without restoring compromised application code or persistence mechanisms?

3. Research Objectives

This paper has the following objectives:

1. Develop a secure recovery methodology for compromised Joomla websites.
2. Apply the methodology to Joomla 5.4.8 → Joomla 6.
3. Compare the recovery requirements of Joomla, WordPress, and Magento.
4. Integrate threat modeling into website recovery.
5. Separate trusted data from untrusted executable code.
6. Develop a clean-rebuild architecture.
7. Incorporate modern web-application security controls.
8. Define post-recovery hardening requirements.
9. Define SEO recovery procedures.
10. Develop an SME-oriented security framework.

4. Theoretical Foundation: Threat Modeling

Threat modeling is an important foundation for the recovery process.

The reference book presents threat modeling as a process of identifying:

• Threat actors
• Attack vectors
• Severity
• Existing mitigations
• Security gaps

It also emphasizes that security planning should consider worst-case scenarios rather than assuming a best-case operating environment.

For a compromised CMS, this means asking:

Who could have attacked the system? ↓ How could access have been obtained? ↓ What privileges were obtained? ↓ What components could have been modified? ↓ What persistence mechanisms could exist? ↓ What data could have been accessed? ↓ What credentials may be compromised?

5. Threat Model for CMS and eCommerce Platforms

A generalized threat model is:

Asset	Threat	Potential Impact
CMS Core	File modification	High
Plugin/Extension	Vulnerability	High
Theme/Template	Code injection	High
Database	SQL injection/data manipulation	Critical
Admin Account	Credential compromise	Critical
Customer Account	Account takeover	High
Payment Integration	Skimming/credential theft	Critical
API	Unauthorized access	High
Upload Directory	Malicious file upload	High
Web Server	Privilege escalation	Critical

Threat modeling helps prioritize resources because not every attack vector has the same severity. The reference book specifically illustrates the value of assigning severity and prioritizing mitigation work.

6. Recovery Philosophy

The central recovery principle is:

Treat the compromised application as untrusted and rebuild the executable environment from known-good software.

This creates a new trust boundary.

OLD SYSTEM Compromised / Untrusted | | Investigation v +---------------------+ | Validated Data | | Evidence | | Logs | | Configuration Info | +---------------------+ | v NEW SYSTEM Known-Good Software

The old filesystem should therefore become an evidence and data source, not the foundation of the new production application.

7. Recovery Lifecycle

The proposed lifecycle is:

DETECT ↓ CONTAIN ↓ PRESERVE ↓ INVESTIGATE ↓ THREAT MODEL ↓ CLASSIFY ↓ SANITIZE ↓ REBUILD ↓ MIGRATE ↓ HARDEN ↓ VALIDATE ↓ REINDEX ↓ MONITOR

8. Phase 1 — Detection

Typical compromise indicators include:

• SEO spam
• Unexpected pages
• Foreign-language content
• Search-engine redirects
• Browser warnings
• Defacement
• Unknown administrator accounts
• Suspicious JavaScript
• Unknown PHP files
• High CPU usage
• Unexpected outbound connections
• Unauthorized database records

SEO spam can be especially deceptive because the visible homepage may appear normal while search engines contain hundreds of malicious pages.

9. Phase 2 — Containment

The compromised website should be isolated.

Possible controls include:

• Maintenance mode
• Web-server restrictions
• WAF blocking
• IP allowlisting
• Temporary DNS changes
• Application shutdown

The objective is to stop the attacker from continuing to modify the system while investigation is performed.

10. Phase 3 — Evidence Preservation

Before modifying the system, preserve evidence.

Recommended evidence includes:

incident/ ├── filesystem/ ├── database/ ├── access-logs/ ├── error-logs/ ├── authentication-logs/ ├── cron/ ├── configuration/ └── investigation/

The original environment should be preserved as much as practical.

11. Phase 4 — Credential Security

All credentials potentially exposed by the compromise should be reviewed.

These may include:

• CMS administrator passwords
• Hosting credentials
• SSH keys
• SFTP credentials
• Database passwords
• SMTP credentials
• API keys
• DNS credentials
• CDN credentials
• Payment-provider credentials

Credentials should be rotated after containment and, where possible, from a clean administrative workstation.

12. Phase 5 — Filesystem Investigation

The filesystem should be investigated for:

• Unexpected PHP files
• Modified core files
• Obfuscated code
• Web shells
• Unknown directories
• Modified templates
• Modified plugins
• Modified extensions
• Suspicious .htaccess
• Files in upload directories

The principle is not merely to find files that "look malicious."

The investigator should compare the application against a known-good version whenever possible.

13. Phase 6 — Database Investigation

The database must be treated as potentially compromised.

Investigate:

• Users
• Administrator accounts
• Permissions
• Articles
• Pages
• Products
• Orders
• Configuration
• Metadata
• Extension tables
• Plugin data

Search for:

• Injected JavaScript
• Suspicious URLs
• Hidden links
• Spam
• Unexpected administrators
• Modified configuration

14. SQL Injection and Database Security

Database security is especially important because a vulnerable application may allow attacker-controlled input to influence database queries.

The reference book demonstrates how unsafe construction of SQL queries from request parameters can create SQL-injection vulnerabilities.

The secure-development principle is:

User Input ↓ Validation ↓ Parameterized Query ↓ Database

rather than:

User Input ↓ String Concatenation ↓ SQL Query

Although modern CMS platforms have improved significantly, vulnerable third-party extensions and custom code can still introduce database-security weaknesses.

15. Joomla 5.4.8 → Joomla 6 Case Study

Joomla 5.4.8 is the primary case study.

The normal Joomla migration process requires compatibility planning and verification of the server environment and extensions.

However, when Joomla 5.4.8 is known to be compromised, the recovery problem becomes different from an ordinary upgrade.

Instead of:

Infected Joomla 5.4.8 ↓ In-place Upgrade ↓ Joomla 6

the preferred security architecture is:

Compromised Joomla 5.4.8 ↓ Investigation ↓ Validated Data ↓ Clean Joomla 6 ↓ Trusted Extensions ↓ Validated Content

Joomla's security guidance provides specific recommendations for compromised or defaced sites.

Joomla Security Checklist — Hacked or Defaced Site

The Joomla migration documentation provides the standard Joomla 5 → Joomla 6 upgrade planning process.

Joomla 5 to Joomla 6 Planning and Upgrade Guide

16. Clean Joomla 6 Architecture

The recommended architecture is:

INTERNET | Firewall | Web Server | Clean Joomla 6 | +-----------+-----------+ | | Trusted Extensions Trusted Template | | +-----------+-----------+ | Database | Backup System

The Joomla 6 core should be downloaded from the official Joomla distribution.

Joomla Official Downloads

17. Joomla Extension Validation

Every extension should be classified:

Known Good Compatible Required Maintained Trusted Vendor

Extensions that cannot meet these criteria should not be restored.

The same principle applies to:

• Components
• Plugins
• Modules
• Templates

18. Joomla Database Reconnection

Blindly reconnecting the old database is potentially dangerous.

Instead:

Old Database ↓ Backup ↓ Inspection ↓ Sanitization ↓ Compatibility Validation ↓ Migration/Reconnection

The administrator should verify the Joomla database schema after migration and confirm that application functionality operates correctly.

19. WordPress Case Study

WordPress demonstrates the same security problem.

A compromised WordPress system may involve:

WordPress Core Plugins Themes wp-content/uploads wp-config.php .htaccess Database Users Cron

The recovery architecture should therefore be:

Compromised WordPress ↓ Contain ↓ Preserve ↓ Investigate ↓ Clean WordPress ↓ Trusted Plugins ↓ Trusted Theme ↓ Sanitized Content ↓ Harden

20. WordPress Database Investigation

Important database areas include:

• Posts
• Pages
• Users
• User metadata
• Options
• Comments
• Custom post types
• Plugin tables

The wp_options area requires particular attention because configuration and plugin data may influence application behavior.

Administrator accounts should be independently validated.

21. WordPress Plugin and Theme Recovery

Plugins and themes should be downloaded again from trusted sources.

Avoid:

Old infected plugin directory ↓ Copy to new server

Prefer:

Verified Plugin Source ↓ Fresh Installation ↓ Configuration ↓ Testing

22. Magento / Adobe Commerce Case Study

Magento presents a more complex security problem because an eCommerce installation may process:

• Customer information
• Orders
• Addresses
• Products
• Inventory
• Payment integrations
• Shipping
• Tax
• API credentials
• Administrator accounts

A Magento compromise should therefore be treated as a potentially high-impact business-security incident.

23. Magento Threat Model

Magento | +-----------+-----------+ | | | Admin Customer Payment | | | +-----------+-----------+ | APIs | Database

Potential attack vectors include:

• Vulnerable modules
• Compromised administrator accounts
• Malicious JavaScript
• Checkout injection
• Web shells
• Database attacks
• API compromise
• Cron persistence

24. Magento Clean-Rebuild Strategy

Compromised Magento ↓ Containment ↓ Evidence Preservation ↓ Filesystem Investigation ↓ Database Investigation ↓ Clean Magento Installation ↓ Verified Composer Dependencies ↓ Trusted Modules ↓ Trusted Theme ↓ Validated Business Data ↓ Payment Testing ↓ Security Validation

Payment functionality should not return to production until checkout and payment integrations have been independently validated.

25. Cross-Platform Comparison

Security Area	Joomla	WordPress	Magento
Core compromise	High	High	Critical
Extensions/plugins	High	Very High	Very High
Templates/themes	High	High	High
Database compromise	High	High	Critical
Admin compromise	Critical	Critical	Critical
Customer data	Moderate	Variable	Critical
Payment security	Extension-dependent	Plugin-dependent	Critical
API security	High	High	Critical
SEO spam	High	High	High
Clean rebuild	Recommended	Recommended	Strongly recommended

26. Cross-Site Scripting

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) is another important consideration.

The reference book discusses reflected, stored, and DOM-based XSS and emphasizes the need to defend against browser-side injection.

For CMS systems, XSS may enter through:

• Articles
• Comments
• Custom fields
• Plugin interfaces
• Theme code
• Administrator interfaces
• Third-party JavaScript

Therefore, content should not automatically be considered safe merely because it is stored in the database.

27. Content Security Policy

Content Security Policy (CSP) provides an additional browser-level defense.

The reference book identifies CSP as an important mechanism for mitigating several browser-based attacks, including XSS, data injection, phishing, framing, and redirect attacks.

A production website can develop a CSP appropriate to its actual dependencies.

A simplified conceptual policy is:

default-src 'self' script-src <approved sources> img-src <approved sources> style-src <approved sources> frame-ancestors 'none'

CSP should be introduced carefully because legitimate CMS plugins, analytics, payment systems, CDNs, and other services may require additional sources.

28. Cookies and Authentication

Authentication cookies should be protected using appropriate browser security attributes.

The reference book explains that cookies are commonly used to carry authentication state and highlights security attributes such as Secure.

Appropriate controls can include:

• Secure
• HttpOnly
• SameSite
• Appropriate cookie scope
• Short session lifetime
• MFA for administrators

These controls reduce opportunities for credential and session theft.

29. CORS and Browser Security

Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) should not be confused with CSP.

The reference book explains that CORS controls which cross-origin browser requests are permitted, while the browser's same-origin model provides an important security boundary.

For CMS and eCommerce APIs:

Browser | | Request v CORS Policy | +---- Allowed | +---- Rejected

CORS should use explicit trusted origins rather than unnecessarily broad policies.

30. CSRF Protection

Cross-Site Request Forgery can be especially significant for authenticated CMS administrators and eCommerce customers.

Important state-changing operations should use:

• CSRF tokens
• SameSite cookies
• POST requests where appropriate
• Authentication checks
• Authorization checks

The objective is to ensure that an attacker cannot cause an authenticated user to perform an unintended operation.

31. Secure Application Configuration

Recovery should not stop when the application starts successfully.

The rebuilt system should be configured securely.

Security configuration should address:

• HTTPS
• Security headers
• Cookies
• CSP
• CORS
• Authentication
• Authorization
• Error handling
• File permissions
• Logging

The reference book emphasizes secure application configuration and the use of browser security mechanisms as an important part of application security.

32. Server Hardening

The CMS is only one component of the security boundary.

A production deployment should also protect:

Operating System Web Server PHP Runtime Database SSH Firewall DNS Backups Monitoring

Recommended controls include:

• Security updates
• Firewall
• SSH key authentication
• Restricted administrative access
• Least privilege
• HTTPS
• Log monitoring
• File-integrity monitoring
• Malware scanning
• Tested backups

33. Threat-Driven Security Prioritization

Not every security issue has equal importance.

The reference book's threat-modeling methodology emphasizes associating attack vectors with severity and prioritizing mitigation accordingly.

A simplified priority model is:

P0 — Critical P1 — High P2 — Medium P3 — Low P4 — Informational

For an eCommerce platform:

Payment compromise → P0 Admin compromise → P0 Database compromise → P0 Malicious extension → P1 SEO spam → P1/P2 Minor configuration → P2/P3

This allows limited SME security resources to be directed toward the highest-risk problems first.

34. Root-Cause Analysis

A successful rebuild is not sufficient.

The organization should determine:

How did the attacker obtain access?

Potential causes include:

• Vulnerable extension
• Vulnerable plugin
• Weak password
• Stolen credentials
• Unpatched CMS
• Vulnerable custom code
• Insecure server
• Excessive permissions
• Compromised hosting account

The reference book emphasizes the importance of considering multiple attack vectors and threat actors rather than assuming only one path exists.

35. SEO Recovery

SEO spam can continue affecting search results after the application has been cleaned.

Recovery should include:

Remove malicious pages ↓ Repair legitimate pages ↓ Check redirects ↓ Check canonical URLs ↓ Generate sitemap ↓ Submit sitemap ↓ Inspect important URLs ↓ Monitor indexing

Google provides official tools for URL inspection, recrawling, and sitemap submission.

Google Search Central — Ask Google to Recrawl URLs

Google Search Console — URL Inspection Tool

Google Search Central — Build and Submit a Sitemap

36. SME Security Framework

Small and medium-sized enterprises should treat website security as part of business continuity.

A compromised website may cause:

• Lost customers
• Lost search rankings
• Lost revenue
• Brand damage
• Customer distrust
• Operational disruption
• Regulatory exposure

The security program should therefore include:

Security + Backup + Monitoring + Incident Response + SEO + Business Continuity

37. Recommended Production Architecture

A secure SME architecture may be:

INTERNET | DNS / CDN / WAF | HTTPS | Nginx / Apache | PHP-FPM | +------------+------------+ | | | Joomla WordPress Magento | | | +------------+------------+ | Database | +------------+------------+ | | | Redis Backups Monitoring

The precise architecture should be adapted to the platform and workload.

38. Backup and Disaster Recovery

Backups should exist independently of the production system.

A practical model is:

Production | +---- Local Backup | +---- Secondary Backup | +---- Offsite Backup

Backup testing is essential.

A backup that has never been successfully restored should not be treated as a proven disaster-recovery mechanism.

39. Validation Before Production

The recovered system should pass:

Security

• Malware scan
• File-integrity check
• User audit
• Extension audit
• Database audit
• Permission audit
• Log review

Application

• Login
• Navigation
• Search
• Forms
• Content
• Media
• Administration

eCommerce

• Product
• Cart
• Checkout
• Shipping
• Tax
• Payment
• Customer account
• Order creation
• Email notification

40. Production Cutover

The recommended process is:

Final Content Freeze ↓ Final Backup ↓ Final Security Scan ↓ Database Validation ↓ Application Test ↓ DNS / Web Cutover ↓ HTTPS Test ↓ Functional Test ↓ Security Monitoring

The old environment should remain preserved until the incident investigation is complete.

41. Recovery Checklist

Containment

• Confirm compromise
• Isolate website
• Preserve evidence
• Preserve logs
• Back up database

Investigation

• Audit administrator accounts
• Audit users
• Inspect files
• Inspect uploads
• Inspect extensions/plugins
• Inspect templates/themes
• Inspect database
• Inspect cron jobs
• Inspect server configuration

Rebuild

• Install clean CMS
• Install clean extensions
• Install clean themes/templates
• Sanitize data
• Migrate validated content
• Validate database schema

Hardening

• Change credentials
• Enable MFA where available
• Secure SSH
• Configure firewall
• Enable HTTPS
• Review permissions
• Configure security headers
• Configure monitoring

SEO

• Remove spam pages
• Check redirects
• Verify canonical URLs
• Generate sitemap
• Submit sitemap
• Inspect URLs
• Monitor Search Console

42. Platform-Specific Checklist

Joomla

• Joomla core rebuilt
• Joomla 6 compatibility confirmed
• Extensions verified
• Templates verified
• Users audited
• Articles inspected
• Database validated

WordPress

• WordPress core rebuilt
• Plugins verified
• Themes verified
• Administrators audited
• Uploads inspected
• Database validated

Magento / Adobe Commerce

• Magento core rebuilt
• Composer dependencies verified
• Modules verified
• Theme verified
• Admin accounts audited
• Customer accounts reviewed
• Payment integration verified
• API credentials rotated
• Checkout tested
• Database validated

43. Discussion

The analysis demonstrates that Joomla, WordPress, and Magento should not be treated simply as collections of website files.

They are complex web applications containing:

Application Logic + Persistent Data + Authentication + Browser Interfaces + APIs + Third-Party Components + Server Infrastructure

The reference book's discussion of modern web applications reinforces the importance of treating application security as a system-level problem rather than a single-file problem. Modern applications expose valuable functionality and persistent data through the web, increasing the consequences of compromise.

Threat modeling provides a structured method for identifying these risks.

Clean rebuilding provides a method for restoring trust.

Security hardening provides a method for reducing future attack probability.

Monitoring provides a method for detecting future attacks.

44. Proposed Security Maturity Model

An SME can assess its website security using five levels.

Level 1 — Reactive

Website + Passwords

Level 2 — Managed

Updates + Backups + Antivirus

Level 3 — Hardened

Firewall + MFA + HTTPS + Permissions + Monitoring

Level 4 — Threat Modeled

Threat Actors + Attack Vectors + Risk Ranking + Mitigations

Level 5 — Resilient

Threat Modeling + Continuous Monitoring + Tested Backups + Clean Rebuild Capability + Incident Response + Disaster Recovery

The objective for an SME operating a business-critical website should be at least Level 4, with Level 5 as the long-term target.

45. Conclusions

A compromised Joomla, WordPress, or Magento installation should be treated as a security incident rather than as a normal software-upgrade problem.

The central finding of this paper is that recovery should establish a new trust boundary.

The recommended methodology is:

Detect → Contain → Preserve → Investigate → Threat Model → Sanitize → Rebuild → Migrate → Harden → Validate → Reindex → Monitor

For Joomla 5.4.8 → Joomla 6, this means avoiding blind trust in the existing filesystem and carefully validating extensions, templates, database records, users, and content.

For WordPress, the methodology applies to core files, plugins, themes, uploads, users, and database content.

For Magento/Adobe Commerce, the methodology must additionally address customer data, orders, payment systems, checkout code, APIs, and eCommerce-specific attack surfaces.

The security concepts from Web Application Security, 2nd Edition provide a useful theoretical foundation for this methodology. Threat modeling helps identify and prioritize attack vectors; secure configuration reduces browser and application risks; database-security practices reduce injection exposure; and browser controls such as CSP, CORS, and secure cookies provide additional layers of defense.

The resulting principle is simple:

Do not restore trust by copying a potentially compromised application. Rebuild trust from known-good software and selectively recover validated data.

For SMEs, this approach transforms website recovery from an ad-hoc emergency activity into a repeatable cybersecurity and business-continuity process.

References

Primary Security Reference

Hoffman, A. Web Application Security, 2nd Edition. The uploaded reference text was used as the theoretical foundation for threat modeling, attack vectors, secure application configuration, SQL injection, XSS, CSRF, cookies, CSP, CORS, and application security principles.

Joomla References

Joomla!, Security Checklist — You Have Been Hacked or Defaced.

Joomla Security Checklist

Joomla User Guide, Joomla 5 to 6 Planning and Upgrade Step by Step.

Joomla 5 to 6 Upgrade Guide

Joomla!, Download & Extend.

Joomla Downloads

Google Search References

Google Search Central, Ask Google to Recrawl Your URLs.

Google Search Central — Recrawl URLs

Google Search Console, URL Inspection Tool.

Google Search Console — URL Inspection

Google Search Central, Build and Submit a Sitemap.

Google Search Central — Sitemaps

Appendix A — Unified Recovery Model

SECURITY INCIDENT | v DETECTION | v CONTAINMENT | v EVIDENCE PRESERVATION | v THREAT MODEL | +------------+------------+ | | v v FILESYSTEM DATABASE ANALYSIS ANALYSIS | | +------------+------------+ | v ROOT CAUSE | v KNOWN-GOOD SOFTWARE | +------------+------------+ | | | JOOMLA WORDPRESS MAGENTO | | | +------------+------------+ | v VALIDATED DATA | v HARDENING | v TESTING | v PRODUCTION | v MONITORING | v CONTINUOUS SECURITY

Appendix B — Core Security Principle

COMPROMISED SYSTEM | | DO NOT TRUST | +------------+------------+ | | v v Preserve Evidence Extract Data Carefully | v Validate / Sanitize | v Clean Application | v Security Controls | v Production System

This architecture is applicable to Joomla, WordPress, Magento/Adobe Commerce, and other extensible web applications.